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There are approximately 10,000 hedge funds worldwide, managing assets of over USD 1.5 trillion. Investment 
banking activities are more and more intertwined with hedge funds, as hedge funds obtain ﬁ  nancing from 
banks through prime brokerage and are clients or counterparties of banks for all sorts of products. The 
development of hedge funds has therefore created many opportunities for investment banks.
Bank beneﬁ  t from hedge funds activities directly to the extent that hedge funds are their clients. All capital 
market activities beneﬁ  t from it, from brokerage and research to derivatives. Prime brokerage has become 
a growing source of income. Banks have a very important business of providing derivatives and products, 
from vanilla products to more complex, customized and exotic products. Hedge funds are also possible 
underlyings for derivatives. Many banks, including Société Générale, have developed a business of writing 
options on hedge funds as well as providing leverage to funds of funds.
Investment banks are not only making proﬁ  ts by transacting with hedge funds. They also beneﬁ  t indirectly 
through more trading: on certain speciﬁ  c specialized market, like structured complex derivatives, there 
would be no market at all without the availability of hedge funds that are willing to take the risks.
Together, as two intertwined partners, hedge funds and investment banks have extended the reach and 
efﬁ  ciency of capital markets. The beneﬁ  ts that this system brings to the economy as a whole is widely 
recognized.
Not only do hedge funds provide important beneﬁ  ts for the economy in general but their risks are 
manageable.
The risks for investors are overplayed. Whatever the risk measure, hedge funds are clearly less risky than 
equities. As regards operational risks, the market itself is able to generate protection solutions. Academic 
research has shown that operational risks can be dealt in the most extensive way by using managed 
account platforms, such as the Lyxor platform.
The risks for banks are under control and the move toward “risk-based margining” has improved very much 
their risk management. Banks in general invest a lot of resources in monitoring hedge funds qualitatively 
through due-diligences. They also put different types of limits in order to cover different aspects of risks: 
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T
here are approximately 10,000 hedge 
funds worldwide, managing assets of over 
USD 1.5 trillion. The hedge funds industry 
is expected to reach USD 2 trillion of assets under 
management (“AUM”) by the end of 2008, with a 
planned annual rate of growth of about 16%.
Anecdotal evidence as much as data suggest 
that investment banking activities are more and 
more intertwined with hedge funds. A rough and 
conservative estimate is that more than 25% of 
investment banking revenues come from hedge 
funds.1
Hedge funds and investment banks have always 
been intimate partners. Many hedge fund managers 
are ex-bank traders. Both businesses belong to the 
same technical culture, a culture of derivatives and 
risks management.
The development of hedge funds has thus created 
many opportunities for investment banks. It has also 
had a very stimulating effect on asset management, 
capital markets and the economy in general.
1| HEDGE FUNDS ARE AN ASSET
MANAGEMENT REVOLUTION
1|1  Short selling and leverage
It is said that the term “hedged fund” dates back to 
a fund founded by Alfred Winslow Jones in 1949. 
This fund was to sell short some stocks while buying 
others, thus some of the market risk was hedged. 
Borrowing securities and selling them, i.e. shorting 
securities, is undoubtedly a main characteristics of 
hedge funds, the distinctive feature that makes them 
different from traditional funds.
With short selling come completely new risk 
parameters and boundaries. Long-only funds can 
characterize their risks as direct exposure to a 
certain category of assets. This is not true any 
more for funds that have short positions as well 
as long ones. There is no simple anchor anymore. 
With borrowing comes leverage and the right level 
of leverage has to be determined. The resulting 
nominal limits, stress test limits, limits on delta, limits on vega, expected tail loss limits. Moreover, they 
regulate their capital requirements using not only Value at Risk, the usual tool used by banks to allocate 
capital to market risks, but also stress tests losses based on the worst possible scenarios. These very 
sophisticated models are quite convincing. There is no reason to believe that they will not work in practice 
under stress conditions.
There are also general consideration about a systemic risk that would be something else than banking 
risks, but it has no real argument to back it up.
Hedge funds are ﬁ  rst of all the result of a signiﬁ  cant improvement of asset management techniques. These 
improvements are here to stay, whatever the regulatory environment will become, since these techniques 
will be more and more part of the mainstream asset management world. Hedge funds are more and 
more institutionalized. They will eventually merge with “classical” asset management, while some forms 
of compromises between hedge funds and classical asset management, such as absolute return funds 
or 130-30 funds, are becoming more common. Hedge funds are just a nice new development of capital 
markets that, like all past capital market developments, will be irreversible and will contribute to a more 
efﬁ  cient ﬁ  nancial system.
1  “European Wholesale Banks – Hedge fund and investment banks”, CSFB research, 09/03/05, pp.1ARTICLES
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degree of risk depends on a deliberate choice of the 
manager, subject to ratiﬁ  cations and limitations by 
the leverage providers, and among them, ﬁ  rst of all, 
by the prime broker.
Short selling and leverage, and also the fact that 
they can use less liquid instruments, make hedge 
funds more ﬂ  exible in terms of investment options 
or strategies than traditional collective investments. 
Hedge funds encompass a wide range of different 
investment objectives, strategies, styles, techniques 
and assets, offering a wide spectrum of risk/return 
proﬁ  les.
Because of this ﬂ   exibility, hedge funds have 
embedded over time a whole set of sociological and 
market characteristics that also makes them very 
distinct from traditional asset management.
1|2 A  speciﬁ  c structure 
  of competence and fees
Shorting securities have allowed different 
benchmarks from the one of the traditional 
long-only funds and have created a strong appeal for 
new ideas, new methods and new people.
This entrepreneurial spirit has led to a structure of 
fees where performance fees are the main source of 
income for the manager. The industry standard is 
2% of AUM and a 20% performance fee. It is said that 
this standard has been created by the ﬁ  rst hedge fund 
manager, A.W. Jones. His reasoning was that “when 
Venetian merchants returned from a successful 
voyage, they took 20% from their patrons”.
This fee structure has caused wealth creation to 
the tune of close to USD 40 billion a year. This 
has allowed asset managers to become mature 
companies, and to compete with traditional asset 
management companies and investment banks for 
the most talented human resources. 
The hedge fund universe has been ﬁ  lled with talented 
managers that have been able promote new ideas, raise 
the stakes, take higher views and in the end undoubtedly 
provide some consistent return, independent of 
classical benchmarks. In all ﬁ  elds of asset management, 
whether it is quantitative or fundamental, they brought 
new techniques and they improved the degree of 
professionalism of the industry.
This new sociological structure has in the end 
become one of the characteristics of hedge funds, 
to the point where it is debatable whether shorting 
securities is still the main characteristics of hedge 
funds, as is exempliﬁ  ed by the new concept, a bit 
provocative, of “long-only” hedge funds.
“Classical” asset management has indeed reacted 
and is now striving to assimilate and incorporate 
this sociological structure. It is now itself following 
an enormous transformation to counter pure hedge 
funds. In the end, it seems that the two worlds are 
coming closer and closer. This raises an issue for 
regulators: does it make sense to discuss speciﬁ  cally 
about hedge funds when they are only a part of 
the asset management world? Wouldn’t it be more 
relevant to discuss about asset management in 
general? There is however one signiﬁ  cant difference: 
most hedge funds are not regulated or lightly 
regulated.
1|3 Unregulated  funds
Hedge funds happen to be lightly regulated because 
classical asset management regulations were not 
allowing short selling and leverage.
Hedge funds have thus been created out of the bound 
of regulation, in some off-shore jurisdiction or using 
some legal structure like US partnerships. Since they 
were not regulated, they have been chasing initially 
investing population that was allowed to purchase 
them, mostly high net worth individuals and some 
institutions.
Alternative management industry still accounts 
for only 5% of the traditional asset management. 
However, hedge funds have seen their client base 
move from family ofﬁ  ces and individual investors 
to ﬁ  nancial institutions such as pension funds and 
insurance companies. Financial institutions were 2% 
of the investors in 2000, 38% in 2005 and will probably 
reach 50% in 2008. This will double the size of the 
alternative industry in the 3 to 5 coming years.ARTICLES
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This tends to “institutionalize” hedge funds, with 
an immediate consequence: a search for more 
transparency, control, reporting and ﬁ  nancial 
robustness and a potential change in the risk proﬁ  le 
with a lower volatility (and potentially return) 
required by such investors. Hedge funds now compete 
head on with “classical” asset management.
As a reaction, asset management regulations are 
now going to be more and more ﬂ  exible and allow 
“classical” asset management to use the same 
techniques as hedge funds. In general, regulators 
do not oppose for a long time the use of new 
techniques. They rather tend to accommodate them 
because they want the best techniques to beneﬁ  t the 
broader public.
Already the new European UCITS Directive 
published in 2002 accepts short positions through 
derivatives. New regulations, for example the 
European recommendation on derivatives2 goes 
further and allows leverage in UCITS without any 
limit, provided that the VaR of the fund stays below 
unspeciﬁ  ed limits.
Regulators tend also to favor more free marketing 
of hedge funds, as is clear in the new European 
Commission white paper on asset management, 
which proposes a European private placement 
regime for the marketing of hedge funds.3
While both worlds move towards each other, we 
see emerging, at the same time, new concepts 
that are sorts of compromise between hedge funds 
and classical asset management, such as “absolute 
return”. Absolute return funds, like hedge funds, 
are not benchmarked, but they use leverage and 
short selling “moderately”. In the United States, 
we are seeing for example classical asset managers 
promoting “130-30” funds, funds that are long 130% 
and short 30%, managed either by “classical” asset 
managers or by hedge funds.
Another interesting development is the increasing 
number of big banks and insurers that are taking 
stakes or acquire hedge fund ﬁ  rms. This is the 
recognition of HFs as a deﬁ  nitive pillar of an asset 
management activity. 
The universe of hedge funds and capital markets, 
on one side, and classical asset management on 
the other side, will eventually merge into the same 
regulatory and cultural framework. For now, it is 
however still reasonable to sideline the hedge fund 
universe as characterized by short selling, leverage, 
light regulation or no regulation, and a speciﬁ  c 
culture based on entrepreneurship, innovation and 
result-based performance.
This universe is a great opportunity for capital 
markets, the economy and banks in particular. It is 
also a source of multiple risks.
2| HEDGE FUNDS ARE
A SOURCE OF OPPORTUNITIES
FOR CAPITAL MARKETS,
THE ECONOMY AND THE BANKS
2|1  Hedge fund provide capital 
  at risk for capital markets
Since hedge funds are more ﬂ  exible than classical 
asset management, they should be able to perform 
better their economic functions. As long as market 
theory assumes that investors play a positive role 
in the economy by contributing to allocating capital 
resources in an efﬁ  cient way, we should expect 
hedge funds to do it also, and better.
In the words of the European Expert Group on 
hedge funds:4 “hedge funds improve the functioning 
of ﬁ  nancial markets. They provide markets with 
liquidity and have a signiﬁ  cant stabilizing inﬂ  uence 
by spreading risks across a broad range of investors. 
Indeed, hedge funds often take alternative market 
views (contrarian trading strategies), can leverage 
their positions and generally change their portfolio 
composition much more frequently than traditional 
funds. Hedge funds also tend to be active in newer 
developing markets, often creating sufﬁ  cient 
liquidity to allow mainstream managers to follow 
2  Corrigendum to Commission recommendation 2004/383/EC of 27 April 2004 on the use of ﬁ  nancial derivative instruments for undertakings for collective investment 
in transferable securities (UCITS) (OJ L 144, 30.4.2004) - http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004H0383R(01):EN:HTML
3  White paper on enhancing the single market framework for investment funds – http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/ucits/whitepaper/
whitepaper_en.pdf
4  Report of the Alternative Expert Group (July 2006) – http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/ucits/reports/hedgefunds_en.pdfARTICLES
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(e.g. credit derivatives markets, over-the-counter 
markets and syndicated bank loans). Hedge funds 
increase market efﬁ  ciency through the arbitrage of 
price differences between similar securities across 
markets or by providing price discovery”.
2|2  Hedge funds are a source 
  of business for banks
Bank beneﬁ  t from such activities directly to the 
extent that hedge funds are their clients. All capital 
market activities beneﬁ  t from it, from brokerage and 
research to derivatives.
According to some research,5 hedge funds generate, 
for major investment banks, 40% of total equities 
trading, 20% of total ﬁ  xed income trading revenues 
and 80% of all trading in distressed debt markets. 
Greenwich associates (2006) reports that hedge 
funds now account for more than 50% of all trading 
on the US ﬁ  xed income markets.
In 2005, hedge funds generated USD 25.8 billion for 
major investment banks. Of which:
• USD 17 billion (65%) attributable to execution 
(sales & trading) activity,
• USD 8.8 billion (35%) attributable to prime brokerage:
– USD 1.2 billion of Clearance & Custody,
– USD 3.4 billion of Trading & Execution within 
the prime brokerage department,
– USD 4.2 billion of Financing (USD 3.3 billion of 
Securities lending and USD 0.9 billion of Margin 
lending).
Investment banking activity with hedge funds 
in 2005 constituted roughly 25% of revenue across 
the industry, up from 15% in 2004, which represented 
USD 25 billion. These amounts will continue to grow 
as hedge funds AUM continue to grow steadily.
EXECUTION ACTIVITIES AND OTC DERIVATIVES
Hedge funds are believed to have paid record 
fees for brokerage services in 2005, equating to 
USD 7.5 billion, up 32 percent from 2003.6
Banks have also a very important business of 
OTC derivatives with hedge funds. They provide 
derivatives and products, from vanilla products to 
more complex, customized and exotic products.
Investment banks are not only increasing proﬁ  t 
from transacting with hedge funds. They also beneﬁ  t 
indirectly through more trading: on certain speciﬁ  c 
specialized market, like structured complex derivatives, 
there would be no market at all without the availability 
of hedge funds that are willing to take the risks.
As ultimate risk takers, hedge funds frequently take 
a layer of risk that most institutions are reluctant 
to consider. They provide the missing link in a 
complex transaction or, more simply, takes the 
risks that others, including banks, are not willing 
to take or cannot take above certain limits. In short, 
they provide a hedge for banks themselves. This 
has opened a speciﬁ  c bank business of selling bank 
risks to hedge funds or other institutions, named 
“alternative risk transfer (ART)”.
Hedge fund managers expertise, experience and 
appetite for high returns provides them with an 
incentive to invest in the riskiest component of 
an issue, such as CDO equity tranches, high yield 
bonds or distressed stocks, or complex and exotic 
market risk, such as correlation or volatility skew. 
Other investors, like most institutional investors, 
naturally avoid these areas due to regulation or a 
lack of knowledge. By allowing investment banks 
to place or to transfer risks, hedge funds give banks 
more space to continue developing business with 
corporate, institutional and even retail clients.
Hedge funds may also hedge other institutions, 
like insurance companies. Every step made by the 
regulators, notably through IFRS and Solvency 2, 
to increase the risks awareness and sensitivity of 
insurance companies, will lead to an added demand for 
5  ABN-AMRO Research 2006, Bernstein Research
6  Sanford C. Bernstein analyst Brad Hintz estimates, quoted in “The money makers”, www.thestandard.com, 28/11/05ARTICLES
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hedge funds to take those risks. As mentions a research 
from Edhec Research Centre:7 “Solvency 2 should 
integrate the issue of asset-liability adequacy in the 
level of capital required, which should lead to (…) more 
structured and sophisticated interest rate products and 
a transfer of some of the risks of mass insurance and 
large insurance risks towards the ﬁ  nancial market”. 
With Solvency 2, regulators are pushing the risks of 
insurance companies towards unregulated investors 
willing to take the risks: hedge funds.
PRIME BROKERAGE
Prime brokerage has become a growing source of 
income. Start-up services, capital introduction, credit 
intermediation, risk management, straight through 
processing (STP), futures and options clearing, 
research, contracts for difference and swaps are 
among the more sophisticated components of 
packages offered by prime brokers. It is estimated 
that global prime brokerage revenues will rise by 
over 60% to USD 15 billion by 2010.8
Many investment banks are also widening their 
services to hedge funds, as recently exempliﬁ  ed by 
Fortis’ acquisition of Hedge Fund Services (HFS), 
the largest fund administrator in the British Virgin 
Islands (March 2006).
Prime brokerage service is however becoming a 
commoditized business with declining margins. This 
decline is offset by new revenue opportunities and 
more industrial operational efﬁ  ciency. Revenue mix 
is changing, from predominantly equity originated 
revenue streams to ﬁ  xed income, commodities, 
foreign exchange and volatility ones, and a marked 
increase of related listed and OTC derivatives.
In 2001, 70% of the funds were invested in equity 
strategies. During the ﬁ  rst semester of 2006, 35% 
of the allocated funds were invested into “blended 
strategies” i.e. which are multi assets and 12% were 
invested in pure ﬁ  xed income. In 2007, more than 
50% of the investments will probably be made 
outside of the equity asset class. Prime brokers should 
beneﬁ  t from this trend since the ﬁ  nancing spreads 
are higher. The trend will favor prime brokers that 
are able to offer multi-asset services and may lead 
to consolidation in the sector.
STRUCTURED PRODUCTS BASED ON HEDGE FUNDS
Hedge funds are also possible underlyings for 
derivatives. Many banks, including Société Générale, 
have developed a business of writing options on hedge 
funds as well as providing leverage to funds of funds.
The business of structured products on hedge 
funds allows, like any structured products business, 
to redeﬁ  ne and restructure the risks according to 
the wishes of clients. As an example, this allows 
investment banks to provide capital guarantees to 
investors that do not wish to take capital risks. More 
usual structures used to be CPPI.9 From CPPI, Société 
Générale has developed structures like Astaris,10
which have been widely replicated in the industry. 
The industry has been more and more creative and 
now embeds many types of exotic options that existed 
before only in the equity world. Structured products 
will play their role in the hedge fund world as they 
have done in the equity market, by customizing 
pay-offs to the precise investors’ needs.
Société Générale, which is a leader in this business, 
estimates the annual worldwide revenues coming 
from this business at around USD  2  billion. 
We expect this business to continue to grow fast.
The business of providing leverage is the part of 
the structured product business where the aim is 
to increase risks rather than reducing them, by 
adding leverage to products instead of providing 
guarantees. This business applies mostly to funds 
of hedge funds, which have a very low risk proﬁ  le: 
by providing leverage, banks increase the returns of 
the product, at a price of more risks.
The universe of manageable risks determines 
the range of actual transactions. Transactions are 
therefore based on sophisticated risk models that 
incorporate different layers of risks and different 
types of risks. The improvement of risks models 
is permanent. Models now allow new types of 
transactions that were not possible a few years ago.
7  The impact of IFRS and Solvency 2 on asset liabilities management and asset management in insurance companies (November 2006) – http://www.edhec-risk.com/
edito/RISKArticleEdito.2006-12-14.5028/attachments/EDHEC%20Study%20Impact%20IFRS%20Solvency%20II%20on%20AM%20ALM.pdf
8  Source: m.a. partners 2006.
9  Constant proportion portfolio insurance. A structure that combines risky and non risky assets and where the exposure on risky assets is reduced when the net asset 
value of the funds comes closer to the present value of the guarantee.
10  “Astaris” is an “enhanced CPPI” structure that combines the beneﬁ  ts of options and those of CPPIs.ARTICLES
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Together, as two intertwined partners, hedge funds 
and investment banks have extended the reach and 
efﬁ  ciency of capital markets.
The beneﬁ  ts that this system brings to the economy 
as a whole are widely recognized. As mentioned by 
the European Central Bank,11 “hedge funds have a 
role as providers of diversiﬁ  cation and liquidity, and 
they contribute to the integration and completeness 
of ﬁ  nancial markets”.
What is often debated, however, is the risks that are 
created by hedge funds, risks for investors, for banks 
or for the economy as a whole.
3| THE DEBATES
ABOUT HEDGE FUNDS RISKS
In order to analyze hedge funds risks, it is crucial 
to differentiate between different types of risks for 
different actors:
• one issue is risks for investors. The debate is driven 
by some examples of fraud, or by some example of 
misunderstanding of risks, like in the Amaranth story; 
• the other issue is risks for banks. This debate has 
been driven, obviously, by the LTCM episode. The 
Federal Reserve felt that it had to intervene, very 
lightly in fact since it did not use any public money 
nor had recourse to any legal action;
• another issue is systemic risk. Systemic ﬁ  nancial 
risk has always been seen as a banking risk so this 
risk is ﬁ  rst of all related to the preceding one.
3|1  Risks for investors
The ﬁ  rst type of risks often mentioned is risks for 
the investors. Indeed, hedge funds are taking risks, 
like any fund, but there is ample proof that hedge 
funds in general are not especially risky, as shown 
by the following table:12
Table 1
Distribution of maximum drawdown13 of hedge funds 
and funds of hedge funds vs. equity funds14
(%)
 Drawdown > 10% > 25% > 50% > 75%
Hedge funds 
Funds of hedge funds  30.5 7.6 0.4 0.0
Single funds 77.0 40.4 10.2 2.1
Mutual funds 
Funds of funds 100.0 93.1 69.6 4.9
Single funds 99.7 97.1 73.7 5.1
This table shows, for example, that 73.7% of mutual 
funds have lost more than 50% of their value, 
whereas only 10% of hedge funds have lost as 
much as that. These data are also true if we use 
volatility, or any other risk parameter. Whatever 
the risk measure, hedge funds are clearly less risky 
than equities.
The intuitive feeling that hedge funds are risky 
is probably a result of the fact that they often 
bear operational and fraud risks. As mention in a 
research paper concerning operational risks,15 “with 
an average of approximately 15 fund collapses per 
year (to be compared to approximately 350 hedge 
fund closures per year) out of a universe of a few 
thousand funds open to investment, it becomes clear 
that the risks related to the operational weaknesses 
of hedge funds signiﬁ  cantly outweighs the level 
of ﬁ  nancial risks, which are usually the focus of 
managers’ attention and investors concerns”.
Hedge funds still face limited regulatory constraints 
and the industry still often lacks maturity as regards 
operational practices, in relation to valuation, 
reporting and risk management. The lack of 
transparency creates risk for investors, from pure 
fraud to style drifting or excessive and unpredictable 
risk taking, the type of risks that we have seen in 
the Amaranth story.
11  European Central Bank, 2005, “Hedge funds and their implications for ﬁ  nancial stability”, Occasional Paper Series, No. 34, August
12  Borrowed from a contribution of Edhec Research Risk Centre to IOSCO Standing Committee 5 on 14 June 2006. 
13  Maximum drawdown is a commonly used statistic for measuring the risk of hedge funds. It looks at the worst possible loss an investor would have endured in a 
fund had he or she bought in at the worst possible time offering an idea of how risky the fund can be.
14  Data from 01/1999 to 12/2005, based on monthly return. There are 374 hedge funds and 236 funds of hedge funds coming from the CISDM database, and 
1495 equity funds and 102 funds of funds coming from Europerformance database.
15  Edhec Risk and Asset Management Research Centre, Jean-René Giraud “Beneﬁ  ts and limitations of managed accounts”, http://www.edhec-risk.com/latest_news/
Alternative%20Investments/RISKArticle.2006-09-15.2338/attachments/Beneﬁ  ts%20and%20Limitations.pdfARTICLES
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These types of risks may affect some investors but are 
not a threat to the economic or ﬁ  nancial system.
It should be mentioned also that the market itself 
is able to generate protection solutions. Academic 
research has shown that operational risks can be dealt 
in the most extensive way by using managed account 
platforms.16 For example, in the Société Générale Group, 
we have created a managed account platform, the 
Lyxor platform,17 that allows investing in hedge funds 
with a certain degree of transparency and independent 
monitoring. Regulators should not continue to ignore 
these structures but on the contrary encourage them 
by appropriate regulatory incentives.
3|2  Risks for banks
Banks encounter different types of risks in their 
several businesses related to hedge funds. 
OTC DERIVATIVES
By entering into OTC derivatives with hedge funds, 
banks incur counterparty risks. They try to limit this 
risk by asking “independent amounts”.
Independent amounts are for OTC markets the 
equivalent of “deposits” in the listed derivatives 
markets. Independent amounts are collateral 
amounts given to the bank, which represent an 
add-on precaution to the marked to market risk. 
Independent amounts are calculated on the basis 
of the global risk on the counterparty, using VaR 
and stress tests. They are often used for exotic 
derivatives. This approach is, however, not generally 
accepted by hedge funds, because it runs counter to 
their wish to optimize their capital usage.
Another technique that works for the beneﬁ  t of 
all parties is the “give-up agreement”. The give-up 
agreements effectively transfer the risk of hedge 
fund default to the prime broker. Give-up agreements 
are very useful because they tend to concentrate the 
risks on those who have a complete view on market 
risks, the prime brokers. The trend is that give-up 
agreements will become the market standard.
PRIME BROKERAGE RISKS
Numerous legal and risk issues are faced by prime 
brokers. Among them:
• credit risk for loans and ﬁ  nancing;
• counterparty risk, market risk, credit risks and 
settlement risk for ﬁ  nancial instruments;
• legal risks on the investment vehicle. The structure 
should be governed by bankruptcy law which 
recognizes the prime broker right to take security 
interest or other security.
Legal risks are mostly linked to the risk of not 
being able to seize and liquidate the collateral. 
The insolvency risk of the customer is the higher 
risk, which can defeat the contractual arrangement 
between the parties.
In addition to the classic law of security and contractual 
set off, modern techniques are available to prime 
brokers willing to mitigate legal risks in the event 
their customers become insolvent. Speciﬁ  c legislation 
on close-out-netting or particular master netting 
agreements or collateral arrangements has enabled 
individual transactions exposures to be reduced.
In the area of ﬁ  nancial risks, the trend is towards 
“risk-based margining”.
“Classical” prime brokerage used lending against 
collateral. Arrangement tended to be based on 
traditional lending fees and requirements for lending. 
This approach was not in itself unfavorable to good risk 
supervision. It could even be argued that such approach 
was in fact too conservative in terms of risks.
The “risk-based margining” idea is to better reﬂ  ect the 
potential loss of the portfolio that underlies the risk of 
the prime broker, by recognizing hedges at single name, 
sector and portfolio level, by rewarding diversiﬁ  cation 
between strategies and considering individual trades 
in the context of the wider portfolio.
Prime brokers are able to cross-margin the positions 
of their customers by using risk methodology and risk 
calculation tools applied to the global portfolio. Stress 
16 See  ibid.
17 http://www.lyxor.comARTICLES
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tests are then used to insure that the proper risks are 
taken into account, through the calculation of margins. 
All the identiﬁ  ed risks are taken into account, in 
accordance with overall risks policies of banks, such as: 
sector risks (risk of sector surge or crash), concentration 
risks, relative risks values (decorrelation of long and 
short), market directional risks and liquidity risks. 
These risks are taken into account in their extreme 
occurrence, through stress tests that use the worst past 
observed modiﬁ  cations of the economic environment, 
as well as extreme imaginary scenarios.
These very sophisticated models are quite convincing. 
There is no reason to believe that they will not work 
in practice under stress conditions.
Moreover, hedge fund managers in general do not 
use all the leverage allowed by their prime brokers 
and current levels of leverage do not seem alarming. 
For example, where a classical long-short equity 
hedge fund would have a leverage of 4 (sum of 
long and short positions equal 4 times the net asset 
value), stress test models tend to show that, in many 
instances, a leverage of 8 or more would be possible. 
This shows that the leverage of a hedge fund is not 
generally linked to the limits required by the prime 
broker but is rather a consequence of the risk return 
proﬁ  le sought by the manager.
One reason is that it is sound practice to limit the 
leverage to a reasonable level in order to leave room 
for more leverage should the market conditions so 
require. Another reason is that hedge funds managers 
tend to be conservative in terms of leverage in order 
to limit the volatility of their fund.
STRUCTURED PRODUCTS ON HEDGE FUNDS
This business is extremely technical and based on 
sophisticated risk models that include two types of 
risks: single hedge funds risks and liquidity risks.
The types of risks that happen in this type of 
structures are “gap risks”, typical for CPPI, which are 
the risks that a sudden downward gap in the value of 
the assets would not allow the timely rebalancing of 
the assets which is needed to insure the guarantee. 
On optional structures, the risks are the typical 
derivatives hedging risks (gamma and vega risks), 
18 Money  ﬂ  owed faster into emerging markets than any other hedge fund strategy in the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2006, according to Tremont Capital Management. Tremont 
reports that inﬂ  ows into emerging markets grew at a rate of 7.97%, well above the overall average percentage of 3.18%. Also registering healthy increases were 
managed futures (4.73%), long/short equity (4.37%) and global macro (4.04%). Total inﬂ  ows for the ﬁ  rst quarter stood at USD 27.6 billion.
ampliﬁ   ed by the low liquidity nature of the 
underlyings. There are also, as in prime brokerage, 
legal risks; managing the legal documentation of 
transactions is an important part of the business.
Banks mitigate their risks by putting in place guidelines 
on the allocation of hedge funds that underlie the 
structured product. They also invest a lot of resources 
in monitoring hedge funds qualitatively through 
due-diligences. They also put different types of limits 
in order to cover different aspects of risks: nominal 
limits, stress test limits, limits on delta, limits on vega, 
expected tail loss limits. Moreover, they regulate their 
capital requirements using not only Value at Risk, the 
usual tool used by banks to allocate capital to market 
risks, but also stress tests losses.
SYSTEMIC RISKS
In their quest for alpha, hedge fund managers are 
forced to look permanently for new strategies.
When one of these strategies proves to be viable, 
a number of managers often move into the same 
space, following a kind of “herd instinct”. 
A recent example could be the rush during the past 
18 months into emerging markets,18 and then into 
commodities. Many managers launched new funds, 
or created new strategies within multi-strategy 
funds, specialising in these markets, creating rapid 
inﬂ  ows that these markets struggle to absorb, thus 
adding to volatility and potential instability.
On the other hand, herding behavior has not been 
proven to be inherent to hedge funds, as have show 
the history of bubbles, from the tulip bubble of 1636 
to the internet bubble of 2000.
Through their ability to engage in short-selling and 
to take contrarian approaches, hedge funds may 
rather act as a counterbalance to market herding. 
Had short selling existed in the 1630s, nobody 
knows, however, whether a “soft landing” of the 
tulip market would have happened...
Hedge funds, which act on a view which is supported 
by ﬁ   rst hand knowledge and detailed analysis of 
companies, help to ensure that they trade at true market ARTICLES
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value which is a stabilizing inﬂ  uence on markets. After 
all, the ﬁ  rst shot at the Enron share before the collapse 
of the company happened to come from a short seller.
Some have however argued that hedge funds 
should put their positions in a database that 
would be able to track the global systemic risks 
of hedge funds.
Skepticism about such database is general. Not 
only because its feasibility is debatable, but also 
because the database would have to include not 
only hedge funds but all capital markets. Since 
any transaction has a counterparty, it is difﬁ  cult to 
see how such database would be useful. Moreover, 
some risks, like liquidity risks, would not be shown 
by such database. 
Hedge funds are ﬁ  rst of all the result of a signiﬁ  cant improvement of asset management techniques. These 
improvements are here to stay, whatever the regulatory environment will become, since these techniques 
will be more and more part of the mainstream asset management world.
Hedge funds provide important beneﬁ  ts for the economy in general and their risks are manageable.
Investors, especially institutional investors, should however not be complacent about the risks. If they wish to 
reduce very much operational risks, they may use risks management technique like “managed accounts”.
As regards their own risks, banks have put in place sophisticated risk techniques that address in a 
conservative way all sorts of risks. This is not to say that there will never be any bank failure because of 
problems with hedge funds, but the degree of risks seems manageable. As US Federal Reserve Board 
chairman Ben Bernanke told the Senate Budget Committee on 18 January. “The approach we have taken 
is a market discipline approach”. “That system has worked pretty well so far.”
There are also general consideration about a systemic risk that would be something else than banking 
risks, but it has no real argument to back it up, except that we have no understanding of what hedge funds 
are doing on a consolidated basis.
Well, there are certainly things that we don’t understand in this world and we therefore have many reasons 
to be afraid of many things. But I would certainly not suggest that we apply a “precautionary principle” 19 to 
ﬁ  nance. I tend to side with the optimists and believe that hedge funds – in spite of some problems that will 
inevitably happen from time to time – are just a nice new development of capital markets that, like all past 
capital market developments, will be irreversible and will contribute to a more efﬁ  cient ﬁ  nancial system.
19  The “precautionary principle” as applied to environmental policy stipulates that any risky practice may rightfully be reduced. According to this principle, 
the burden of proof lies with those asserting the harmlessness of the practice.